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Abstract: Wireless routers are appearing in homes in increasing numbers. Many of
these routers are left in a default configuration completely without security, and even
more are not effectively secured. At the same time people are increasingly reporting
concerns about privacy and security online.1 What factors contribute to the general
state of insecurity in home-based wireless networks? Building on past work on the
economics of security and privacy, this paper develops three rational choice
economic hypotheses that predict the adoption of security measures for wireless
routers. According to previous work, the risks associated with a lack of security (i.e.,
increased housing density or a greater number of assets to protect) should predict the
adoption of security technology. Other researchers have argued that privacy and
security are simply not generally understood by consumers. Thus, higher levels of
formal education among consumers might predict adoption. This paper fully
develops these hypotheses and tests them empirically.
A series of wardrives were conducted to examine the relative state of security of
wireless access points in neighborhoods representing key demographics. 2 After a
comprehensive study of the resulting 2500 data points, I discovered that the only
* The author would like to thank Jean Camp of the Indiana University School of Informatics
for her advice and mentorship during this project. Informatics students Matt Deniszcuk and
Andrew Carter were instrumental in wardriving.
I Jonah D. Seiger, "Privacy, Security & Trust on the Political Web: Factors that Influence the
Willingness of Internet Users to Provide Sensitive Personal Information to Political Web
Sites," (The Institute for Politics, Democracy & the Internet, March 2003),
http://www.ipdi.org/uploadedfiles/privacy securityand-trustsurveyfinal.pdf (accessed
October 31, 2007).
2 "Wardriving" is the act of searching for and cataloging wireless networks by a person in a
moving vehicle using a wireless-equipped computer, such as a laptop or a PDA.
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indicator of implementation of wireless security measures appears to be router type.
Routers with default security configuration were found to be secure 97% of the time,
while identifiable Linksys Secure Easy Setup routers were only secure 88% of the
time. The percentage of routers classified as securely configured in the entire study
was 61%.
The surprising results of this extensive wardriving effort are that interface design and
default settings appear to be the dominant factors in determining utilization of
security measures, indicating consumers are making rational choice decisions in the
area of home wireless security. The rational economics hypotheses I tested do not
predict adoption of security measures in the case of home-based wireless. Finally,
strictly market-based policies would arguably be inadequate. In closing, alternate
bases for policy development are examined and future work to test defaults and
usability as policy tools is described.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper reports on the factors that have been argued in
empirical studies and quantitative models of security decision-making
to predict adoption of security and privacy mechanisms. This paper
describes and evaluates the factors that bear on the implementation of
encryption in wireless access points. Section I describes consumer
privacy and security concerns at a general level. Section II provides
more detail on the specific motivation for the experiment conducted;
Section III describes the wardriving experiment. The results of the
study are reviewed in Section IV; the implications of the findings are
discussed in Section V. Section VI provides a summary of my
findings, a discussion of the policy implications of the findings and the
direction of further research on the subject, as well as concluding
remarks.
A. THEORY AND MOTIVATION
This section begins with a basic discussion of privacy and security
theory followed by a description of the specific work on the economics
of security that motivated the hypotheses underlying my study.
The advent of the Information Age has created a new set of
economic factors that have hastened the erosion of personal privacy.
Computing systems have increasingly become interconnected, while
computing devices have been integrated into practically all aspects of
our lives. This tendency toward connection and integration creates an
environment where private personal information can be collected and
traded; intrusive spam email can reach us in our homes and websites
can track our every surfing move online.
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But what exactly is privacy? Jim Harper of the Cato Institute
defines privacy as "the subjective condition that people experience
when they have power to control information about themselves and
when they exercise that power consistent with their interests and
values." 3 Under this definition, acceptable privacy levels depend on
the judgments of individuals, not society as a whole. Furthermore, this
view does not treat privacy as a right per se, but as a personal
condition that must be maintained by "exercising personal initiative
and responsibility." 4 In other words, each individual is responsible for
personal vigilance when protecting her personal level of privacy in the
face of privacy-eroding efforts.
For the purposes of this experiment, we define privacy to consist of
three elements: secrecy, autonomy, and seclusion. Secrecy refers to
the right to control the proliferation of personal information, autonomy
is the right to be free from observation, and seclusion is the "right to
be let alone."5  Each of these aspects of privacy is threatened by
participating in online activities. For example, secrecy can be
negatively impacted when a website shares the personal information it
acquires from clients with outside parties. Seclusion can be violated
by spam, spim, or pop-up advertisements. 6 Autonomy is impacted
when advertising companies use cookies to track people as they view
pages across multiple sites as well as by the use of identifying
technologies.
"Security" can be defined as the state of being free from risk or
exposure to damage from accident or attack.7 Security consists of the
3 Jim Harper, "Understanding Privacy - and the Real Threats to It," Cato Institute: Policy
Analysis, no. 520 (August 2004): 2, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa520.pdf (accessed
October 31, 2007).
4 Ibid., 5. These terms, used to describe a "right to privacy," were coined by Justice Brandeis
in his dissent to the majority opinion in a vary famous Fourth Amendment United States
Supreme Court case, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
5 L. Jean Camp and Carlos A. Osorio, "Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for Internet
Commerce," (working paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
August 2002), http://ksgnotesl .harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP02-
033/$File/rwp02_033_camp.pdf (accessed October 31, 2007); see also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
6"Spim" is a term referring to unsolicited messages received via instant messaging
applications.
7 Seymour Bosworth and M.E. Kabay, eds., Computer Security Handbook, 4th ed. (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 1-2.
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set of means by which consumers limit risks to the resources they own.
These protected resources can be electronic files or physical property,
as well as resources like network capacity, human attention span,
behavior within the home, reputation, and information about surfing
habits.
Security has three goals: confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. First, confidentiality is the security goal of preventing
unauthorized access to resources. 9 Physical security measures that fall
into this category include the use of window blinds, fences, and post
office boxes. Policy measures include the creation and utilization of a
do-not-call list. The do-not-call list provides security by preventing
outside intrusion into the sanctity of the home and abuse of the call-
recipient's resources, including the use of the recipient's telephone line
and her attention. Other technology-based confidentiality controls
include measures such as firewalls and encryption. Authentication and
authorization systems are double-edged swords that can be used to
protect confidentiality by limiting access to data or to violate
confidentiality by implementing surveillance.
Second, integrity is the attempt to maintain resources free of
unauthorized alteration; third, availability is the goal of ensuring that
resources remain accessible when required by authorized entities. 10
Many security controls work to meet multiple security goals. For
example, the aforementioned do-not-call list also operates as an
availability measure; it increases the availability of telephone lines by
freeing them from unwanted calls.
Security controls are implemented based on the individual's
perception of a threat to personal resources. Risk can be defined as the
probability that a particular attack will occur multiplied by the loss
potential of the attack.'1 If either factor is perceived to be low, then it
is unlikely that any security measures will be introduced.
What are the risks associated with the erosion of privacy? One
potential use of personal information is price discrimination. Price
discrimination is the practice of charging different prices for the same
good based on the consumer's perceived willingness to pay. This
allows a seller to sell goods at several points along the demand
8 Ibid., Chap. 5 Sec. 1.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
I "Ibid.
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curve. 12 In order for sellers to effectively price discriminate, accurate
personal information is required. Price discrimination reduces the
consumer surplus which maximizes cost efficiency for the
seller/producer. The seller, therefore, has an economic incentive to
gather enough personal information to set a price for a consumer that
is closer to the price that the consumer is willing to pay for a good.
The consumer has a competing economic interest in keeping the same
information private.
Identity theft presents a combined security and privacy risk.
Identity theft is the capture and use of personally identifying
information for the purpose of conducting financial fraud. 13 The true
cost of such an attack to the consumer is not measured in terms of the
money stolen using the fraudulent credentials because liability in fraud
cases is limited in many jurisdictions. Rather, the actual cost to the
victim is measured in loss of credit standing and the resources spent to
fix the individual's financial records, which can often take years. 14
Victims of identity theft can also face loss in the form of permanent
damage to their reputation and relationships as well as job loss when
credit cards issued in their name to identity thieves are used for
criminal or embarrassing activities such as obtaining child
pornography.' 5
A relatively new factor in the online privacy equation is the
emergence of wireless networking technologies. The creation of the
graceful and efficient wireless protocols defined as the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard has made
12 Alessandro Acquisti and Hal R. Varian, "Conditioning Prices on Purchase History,"
Marketing Science 24, no. 3 (2005): 367; Andrew Odlyzko, "Privacy, Economics, and Price
Discrimination on the Internet," in Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on
Electronic Commerce 2003, A CM International Conference Proceeding Series 50 (Boston,
Massachusetts: ACM Press & Addison-Wesley Professional, 2003): 356,
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfn?id=948051 (accessed October 31, 2007); Luc Wathieu,
"Privacy, Exposure, and Price Discrimination," (working paper, Marketing Unit, Harvard
School of Business, Harvard University, 2002).
13 Dorothy E. Denning, Information Warfare and Security (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1999): 241-46.
14 Ibid.; Synovate, Federal Trade Commission - Identity Theft Survey Report (McLean, VA:
Synovate, 2003), http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/pdf/synovate.report.pdf (accessed October
31, 2007).
15 CBC News, "Global Child Pom Probe Led to False Accusations," Canadian Broadcast
Corporation, March 14, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/O3/14/landslide-
pom06O314.html (accessed October 31, 2007).
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participating in the online world via wireless access easier and more
convenient. The system was initially confined to business use due to
prohibitive costs, but recent years have witnessed a large increase in
the home adoption of wireless devices. Wireless routers designed for
home use are fairly similar in price and security capability. This
technology allows easier access for everyone and as a result, wireless
security can be problematic. Instead of requiring a physical
connection to a home network, anyone with the proper hardware and
software can connect to a wireless device and potentially access both
the private internal network and any connected wide area network
(WAN). The intruder need only be in fairly close proximity to the
wireless device to access the network. Security mechanisms such as
encryption and Media Access Control (MAC) address authentication
are available via configuration in practically all home-based wireless
routers. 16
Unsecured wireless networks present cybercriminals with virtual
immunity to prosecution. Anyone can drive near an open node,
connect to the Internet by accessing the network bandwidth resources
supplied by the router, and then engage in a variety of activities
ranging from sending spam emails to downloading child pornography
to distributing malicious code. Once done, the attacker can simply
drive away leaving little evidence of its presence. Perhaps an even
more likely scenario is a neighbor using an open access point to share
and download copyrighted material. Each of these actions carries
clear economic costs that can potentially be borne by the actual victim
of the crime (loss of property or system damage, etc.) as well as the
owner of the open access point (lawsuits or criminal investigation,
etc.). 17 The recent activity of the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) in pursuing copyright infringement cases
demonstrates this point. These lawsuits associated an Internet Protocol
(IP) address with the alleged distribution of copyrighted content.1 8
The RIAA was able to obtain defendants' names by subpoenaing
Internet Service Provider (ISP) records. 19 An out-of-court settlement
for a copyright infringement suit brought by the RIAA is usually
16 Bosworth and Kabay, Computer Security Handbook, 1-2; Denning, Information Warfare
and Security, 241-46.
17 CBC News, "Global Child Porn Probe Led to False Accusations."
18 Ray Beckerman, "How the RIAA Litigation Process Works," Recording Industry vs. the
People, October 10, 2007, http://info.riaalawsuits.us/howriaa-printable.htm (accessed October
31, 2007).
19 Ibid.
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2007] OTJT20$3750 regardless of the number of infringement counts.20 The RJAA
will generally seek $750 in damages per song if the case goes to trial.21
In the case of unsecure wireless routers, the defendant in these suits
may have had nothing to do with the infringement activity but will
bear the cost anyway.
Other risks impose costs that fall more squarely on the owner of
the wireless access point. These costs can include the loss of
information stored on computing devices connected to the wireless
node, including financial and personal information, which could be
used in an identity theft attack. If the node is left in a complete default
state, an attacker can access the router administration panel,
reconfigure the Domain Name System (DNS) settings to point to a
different IP address, and engage in a pharming attack that can reveal
account username and-password information for websites that contain
financial information. In addition, an attacker can collect and
decipher wireless packets and track the activities of computers using
that wireless node.23 Therefore, a motivated and competent attacker
can potentially gather a variety of sensitive information about a victim
by engaging in activities such as monitoring web surfing habits and
reading emails.
One potential solution is to encrypt the network traffic.
Implementing encryption technology on a wireless router helps to
meet several security goals. Encryption protects confidentiality by
preventing access to content during transmission: files, emails, and
URLs. An attacker may still be able to intercept the encrypted
transmission but will not be able to decrypt the content.24 Encryption
preserves integrity by preventing tampering with files, transmissions,
and configurations. Encryption secures availability by blocking
attackers' use of bandwidth and by reserving the resource for
authorized individuals. Therefore, implementing encryption on a
home-based router helps protect all three aspects of personal security.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Alex Tsow, "Phishing with Consumer Electronics - Malicious Home Routers," (workshop,
Models of Trust for the Web: 15th International World Wide Web Conference, Edinburgh,
Scotland, May 22-26, 2006): 1-16 (available at http://www.cs.indiana.edu/-atsow/papers/mal-
router-long.pdf).
23 Bosworth & Kabay, Computer Security Handbook, Chapter 8 Section 3.
24 Denning, Information Warfare and Security, 286-310.
2007] HOTrELL
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Home-based wireless access points are usually installed by non-
technical consumers and are often left in a default, unsecure
configuration. There are a variety of reasons why consumers might
leave their wireless access points unsecured. One reason is that the
owner may wish to share an existing Internet connection as a public
good. Many coffee shops use this strategy to attract and retain
customers. Another reason consumers do not secure their wireless
access points is a lack of knowledge. Effectively securing a wireless
router without assistance requires an understanding of several basic
encryption and networking concepts which many consumers simply
lack. An access point will generally work in its default, unencrypted
configuration, when the correct cables are plugged into the router and
it is turned on. "Plug-and-play" results in many user-installed systems
that remain unprotected.
Some wireless consumers do not secure their devices because they
do not understand the risks associated with an open node, while others
understand the risk but judge the risk to be small enough to accept.
This creates a problem in that either many consumers do not know
what can be done with the information they make available, or they do
not understand the complicated nature of the impact of the threat. A
recent study of Facebook.com showed that many consumers willingly
place sensitive private information online. When the consumers were
asked if they wished for the information to be public, they said they
wanted it to remain private. 26 Another issue is that many users may
have developed the wrong mental model of what their expected
contribution to security should be, based on the metaphors they
27encounter. For example, if the metaphor used for security is
"information warfare" then the average citizen of the Internet might
25 For a discussion of the issue, see Adam Shostack and Paul Syverson, "'People Won't Pay
for Privacy,' Reconsidered" (2nd Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security,
College Park, MD, May 29, 2003) http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/rhsmith3/papers/
Finalsession3_shostack_privacy.pdf (accessed November 5, 2007) (A later version, "What
Price Privacy?," is available here http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/publications/CHACS/
2004/2004shostack-valupriv.pdf (accessed October 31, 2007)); L. Jean Camp and Lewis
Stephen, "Economics of Information Security," Advances in Information Security 12 (2004):
7-20.
26 For a discussion of the issue, see Ralph Gross and Alessandro Acquisti, "Information
Revelation and Privacy in Online Social Networks," in Proceedings of the 2005 ACM
Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (New York, NY: ACM, 2005)
http://portal.acm.org/toc.cfmn?id=l 102199 (accessed October 31, 2007) (scroll down to the
"Privacy Issues in Practice" session to access the paper).
27 L. Jean Camp, "Mental Models of Security," IEEE Technology and Society (forthcoming).
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believe that fighting back against cyber-guerillas should be left up to
the security professionals, while they simply pay their "Internet taxes"
to their ISP.
Whatever the case may be, wireless consumers may believe that
the cost of implementing and maintaining wireless security measurably
lowers the benefits of wireless consumption. 28  For example, the
implementation of an access control list security mechanism requires
that any new devices connected to the router first be registered.
Assuming the owner knows how to accomplish this task, the process
of finding the MAC address of the new device, logging in to the
wireless router and entering the new MAC address into the database
must be performed each time the owner wishes to connect a new
device to the network. The cost of performing this series of steps may
be too high, particularly for the uninformed user.
II. PREDICTORS OF HOME-BASED WIRELESS SECURITY
This section more closely examines the factors that may impact the
security configuration of wireless devices.
A. Is EDUCATION THE PROBLEM?
One factor that may predict wireless security is the education level
of the consumer. As noted above, implementing wireless security
requires a basic level of networking knowledge that most consumers
do not have. Effective education could give consumers this basic
knowledge and allow them to make better choices about protecting
their privacy. Education in a formal college or university setting might
create an environment where consumers are exposed to more
information about technology in general and specifically wireless
networks. Concurrent study results indicate that wireless security rates
in predominately student populations increased 9% after the university
launched a security awareness campaign. 29
One could also argue that one of the benefits of a formal higher
education is a better understanding of the risks of privacy erosion. Hal
Varian, Fredrik Wallenberg and Glenn Woroch found that years of
28 Kai-Lung Hui and I.P.L. Png, "The Economics of Privacy," Handbook in Information
Systems 1 (2006), http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/-ipng/research/privacyISE.pdf (accessed
October 31, 2007).
29 M. Deniszczuk, Matthew P. Hottell, and D. Carter, Does Education Work? A Quantitative
Evaluation of the Behavioral Effects of Security Education (forthcoming).
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formal education was a significant predictor of whether people had
signed up for the national do-not-call list. This suggests that more
highly-educated people understand the inherent risks and are more
likely to take steps to protect their privacy. On the other hand,
Wathieu and Friedman found that individuals are already generally
aware of privacy risks and need no prompting to be concerned."
Hypothesis 1: Higher education level predicts greater adoption of
wireless security.
If education is found to be a predictor of wireless security, the
obvious response is a call for better educational initiatives to empower
naive consumers as they attempt to make decisions about wireless
security and privacy risks.
B. ARE PRIVACY AND SECURITY LuxuRY GOODS?
By definition, a luxury good is one that is consumed
disproportionately or solely by the wealthy.32 Can security and
privacy be considered luxury goods? Varian, Wallenberg and Woroch
found that consumers at the highest income level (>$100,000 per
household) were the most likely to sign up for the do-not-call list.33
This may indicate either that people who are wealthier are more likely
to value their privacy or that the comparatively wealthy understand the
potential risk of privacy erosion.
Shostack and Syverson point out that consumers often pay for
goods or services that enhance privacy and that even the most
uninformed wealthy person is better able to pay to have a
30 Hal Varian, Fredrik Wallenberg and Glenn Woroch, "Who Signed Up for the Do-Not-Call
List?" (The Third Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security, University of
Minnesota, May 13, 2004): 2, http://www.dtc.umn.edu/weis2004/varian.pdf (accessed October
31, 2007).
31 Luc Wathieu and Allan Friedman, "An Empirical Approach to Understanding Privacy
Valuation," (The Fourth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 3, 2005): 6,
http://infosecon.net/workshop/pdf/WathFriedWEIS05.pdf (accessed October 31, 2007).
32 Yacine ARt-Sahalia, Jonathan A. Parker and Motohiro Yogo, "Luxury Goods and the Equity
Premium," The Journal of Finance 59, no. 6 (December 2004): 2959-3004,
http://www.princeton.edu/-yacine/richc.pdf (accessed October 31, 2007).
33 Varian, Wallenberg and Woroch, "Who Signed Up for the Do-Not-Call List," 13.
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knowledgeable person configure his or her wireless router to provide
maximal security than a less well-off counterpart.
34
One of the most likely outcomes of privacy erosion is price
discrimination. 35 Price discrimination requires good information to be
effective, and price discrimination affects more adversely affects those
who have the means to pay more for a good. Therefore, one would
expect that the wealthy would have greater incentive to protect their
information assets knowing that the release of that information could
bear a real cost in terms of a higher price paid for goods.
By definition, a wealthy person has more assets to protect.
Extortion, loss of income due to reputation damage, or seizure of
property are risks associated with a secure wireless router that increase
correspondingly in absolute terms with wealth.37
Hypothesis 2: Higher income predicts greater adoption of wireless
security.
Income could be highly correlated with education; therefore,
wealthier consumers may also have a better understanding of the risks
and be better prepared to mitigate them. In the regression discussed
below, these variables were treated separately. This is feasible due to
the demographics of the neighborhoods chosen.
C. Is POPULATION DENSITY AN INDICATOR OF WIRELESS SECURITY?
There are many reasons why population density may be a good
predictor of higher levels of wireless security. One such reason is that
some apartment complexes provide free Internet access to their
residents. These complexes often engage in education campaigns to
encourage residents to secure their access points, thereby raising
awareness of security and privacy issues in the complex. Another
consideration is that it may be easier to identify local experts when
population density is high. These experts may help increase the
general level of security in the area by sharing their knowledge with
others or by actually configuring other access points.
34 Shostack and Syverson, "What Price Privacy?," 9-10.
35 Odlyzko, "Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the Internet," 358-60.
36 Ibid.
37 Seiger, "Privacy, Security, and Trust on the Political Web."
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Yet the core reason to expect higher population density to result in
better security is risk. Risk of abuse is greater in terms of the
likelihood of malicious action. Detection of a malicious actor is more
difficult. For someone living in a remote location, the detection of
potential attackers is fairly easy as it might involve recognizing that
there is a strange vehicle adjacent to the consumer's home. Identifying
potential attackers in a highly populated area is not so straightforward.
There could be dozens of people who have the ability to access another
person's wireless device from the privacy of the attacker's home. This
occurs outside public view and beyond observation by the router's
owner. Assuming that the probability that a person is an attacker is
evenly distributed, higher population areas are therefore subject to a
greater risk of attack. The sheer number of potential attackers who can
access a wireless device in a densely populated area may create an
incentive for the consumer to invest more resources to implement
secure wireless.
Hypothesis 3: Higher population density predicts greater adoption of
wireless security.
Wealth increases the magnitude of loss or loss potential. Density
increases the probability of exposure to an attack to the extent that it
decreases the attacker's risk of detection.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Data about the state of individual wireless access points was
collected in a "wardrive" of sixty-two neighborhoods in a small
college town. The neighborhoods surveyed represented a wide range
of economic and educational demographics, and included both
apartment/condominium complexes as well as single-family homes.
The data was collected using two different laptop computers, one with
a GPS unit attached for accurate plotting of access points. The
software utilized for the data collection was NetStumbler, available at
http://www.netstumbler.org.
Initially, over 3,000 access points were identified during five
separate wardriving sessions which lasted a total of twelve hours. Any
commercially owned access points, identifiable either by Service Set
Identifier (SSID) or wireless router maker were purged from the data
set in an attempt to limit data points to home-based consumers. All
unique access points appearing in more than one neighborhood were
also discarded to avoid data duplication. Three neighborhoods in
which less than eight access points were present were dropped from
[Vol. 3:2
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the data set as well, giving us a final total of fifty-nine neighborhoods
surveyed and 2,443 individual access points recorded.
Once access point data was collected, each neighborhood was
given a score reflecting the percentage of wireless access points that
were identified as secure in that area. For purposes of this study, a
secure wireless access point is defined as one that utilizes any form of
encryption technology. A variable named edlevel, representing the
percentage of residents with at least a bachelor's degree as determined
by US Census Track (2000 Census) data, was added to each
neighborhood to test Hypothesis 1. For Hypothesis 2, a variable named
income, representing consumer income level, was approximated using
rental rates for apartments and a calculated mean mortgage payment
(10% of home value down, amortization over 30 years at 7% interest)
for homes. Finally, a dummy variable named pdensity, representing
high or low population density, was assigned to each neighborhood to
test Hypothesis 3. A regression was then run using the following
equation:
% secured wireless points =
flo + /, * edlevel +,82 * income + /33 *pdensity
IV. RESULTS
The results of the regression can be seen in Tables 1 and 2 below.
None of the variables were found to be significant; therefore, we must
reject all three hypotheses and conclude that income, education level,
and population density are all not predictors of increased wireless
security.
Table 1: Regression statistics
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.1181
R Square 0.0140
Adjusted R Square -0.0398
Standard Error 0.1342
Observations 59
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Table 2: Parameter estimates
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 0.665802 0.067813 9.818 0.00000
Edlevel -0.000815 0.000998 -0.817 0.41736
Income -0.000008 0.000047 -0.162 0.87170
Pdensity -0.002968 0.038681 -0.077 0.93911
Chart 1: % Wireless Secured vs. Education Level
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V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this study, none of the data tested under each hypothesis were
found to be significant.38  We cannot say with any certainty that
income, population density, or education level have any effect on the
expected level of wireless security.
These findings indicate that investing resources in large-scale
educational campaigns to raise awareness of wireless security may be
a misallocation of resources in the case of encryption for home-based
wireless routers. Education levels had no statistically significant
effect. The results also suggest that increasing levels of wireless
security should not be expected to correlate with increasing wealth. In
addition, users cannot be expected to protect themselves more
effectively against increased risk to the extent that population density
or a larger asset base indicates risk of misuse. There is no reason to
assume that proposals to increase risk in the form of liability would be
more effective than increased risk from housing density. Housing
density is a visible and constant increase in the probability element of
risk.39 Liability would be invisible and not uniformly allocated. Thus
arguments that are based on an informed, self-optimizing, technically
competent self-securing public are flawed and proposals that are
directed at altering the behavior of na've users by allocating liability to
those consumers are at best ineffective and potentially
counterproductive.
One interesting result is an abnormally high percentage of access
points with a default SSID but with encryption enabled from vendor
2Wire, available at http://www.2wire.com. Upon further research, it
was found that 2Wire's wireless product comes with an installation
wizard that walks a user through the setup which securely configures
their access point. There were 340 2Wire routers with default SSlDs,
or 13.9% of the total access points polled and 330 of those routers
were secure, providing a 97% lockdown rate. Another set of fifty-
seven routers identifiable as Linksys Secure Easy Setup models were
found to have an 88% security rate. According to the Linksys website,
available at http://linksys.com, these SES routers can be automatically
configured to use encryption by pressing first a hardware button on the
router and then a software button on a connected computer,
eliminating the need for any decision making or manual configuration
by the user. Removing these two types of routers from the data, we
3" Each hypothesis was supported by the economics of information security.
39 Risk = probability of an attack x potential loss.
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found that only 55% of the other routers were configured by users to
be secure. These figures are summarized in Table 3 below and they
correspond closely with findings from a recent study that found that
default settings on wireless routers are powerful indicators of
secunty.4 °
Table 3: Wireless security levels by vendor
Router n Secure % Secure
2Wire 340 330 0.971
Linksys SES 57 50 0.877
All others 2046 1116 0.545
Total 2443 1496 0.612
Defaults have been found to be extremely important in predicting
behavior in several realms. Organ donation participation rates in
countries where an opt-in mechanism was used were significantly
higher than in countries where opt-out mechanisms were employed."
In the realm of software, Bellman, Johnson and Lohse found that
default framings of opt-in/opt-out choices on a questionnaire had a
significant effect on participation rates. 42  More specific to the
question at hand, Sandvig and Shah found that default settings
dominated user behavior with regard to wireless access point
configuration.43 It appears from the wardriving data that default
settings do make a difference in the lockdown rate of home-based
wireless routers.
An obvious response to this observation is a call for better
interfaces that are specifically designed to provide scaffolding for
uninformed consumers as they attempt to make decisions about
wireless security and privacy risks. One possible scaffolding option
40 Rajiv Shah and Christian Sandvig, "Software Defaults as De Facto Regulation: The Case of
Wireless APs," Information, Communication and Society (forthcoming)
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/427/TPRC%20Wireless%20Defaults.pdf (accessed
October 31, 2007).
41 Eric Johnson and Daniel Goldstein, "Do Defaults Save Lives?," Science 302, no. 5649
(2003): 1338-39.
42 Steven Bellman, Eric J. Johnson, and Gerald L Lohse, "To Opt-In or Opt-Out? It Depends
on the Question," Communications of the ACM44, no. 2 (2001): 25-27.
43 Shah and Sandvig, "Software Defaults as De Facto Regulation," 10-12.
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might be a configuration wizard that walks a user through the process
of locking down their router, just as the 2Wire routers provide. This
could be considered a "usable security" approach that allows for
assisted decision-making and potentially more flexible security
outcomes.
Another option is that of the Linksys SES method, which removes
all configuration responsibilities from the user other than the push of
two buttons. This would be a "security as default" method, where all
routers are configured to the same general security profile and
consumer choices are severely limited.
The usable security paradigm would enable meaningful consumer
choice and flexibility, for example, by allowing Internet sharing in
lower income neighborhoods in a secure manner. The initial data
indicates that this approach is slightly more effective than the security
as default method, but further studies should focus on the relative
merits of each approach.
One of the limitations of this study is that many of the locations in
the study were college student locations and age was not taken into
account in the study. Future research will include looking at age as a
possible factor, with age cohorts representing years of computer use.
However, obtaining this information is currently an unsolved research
problem.
This has been an empirical study of homo economus, i.e. the self-
optimizing risk-aware human of rational choice economic theory.
4 4
Other ongoing research involves behavioral studies such as an
examination of the mental models of users with regard to wireless
security as well as user awareness of privacy and security risks.
Further studies will also focus on the usability differences between the
two styles of secure router configuration. Formal usability analysis of
wireless router installation and configuration is currently being
undertaken by researchers in the Human-Computer Interaction
program at the Indiana University School of Informatics. Use of those
findings will allow us to better investigate our emergent hypothesis
that only usability and default configuration predicts use of security in
home-based wireless devices.
44 A good overview of rational choice economic theory by John Scott of Essex University can
be found at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/-scottj/socscot7.htm.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The most effective predictors for secure wireless configuration are
not rational choice factors such as income, education level or
population density as might be inferred by early research in the
economics of security. The best predictor is the type of router
purchased by the consumer. Default settings and effective usability
seem to be the driving forces behind wireless security. Thus, any
policy aimed at increasing the security of the infrastructure by
changing user behaviors should be grounded in enabling security
through defaults and usability. Regardless of the policy investment in
the rational model, end users will not implement the calculus of risk
but will plug and play.
The most powerful determinants of wireless security in the home
are the choices made in the factory. Neither increased risk nor
increased levels of formal higher education alters consumer choices.
Therefore, default configurations and usability are powerful
determinants of the risk to consumers and security policies taking this
into consideration should be adopted.
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